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Abstract—This paper considers a procedure for multi-area
static security assessment of large interconnected power systems
operated by a team of Transmission System Operators (TSOs).
In this procedure, each TSO provides the other TSOs with
his own equivalent model as well as the detailed effects of
contingencies in his control area on all tie-line ﬂows. The paper
deals with the implementation of sensitivity-based equivalents
suitable for static security assessment. Accuracy with respect to
the unreduced model and computational efﬁciency are considered
in evaluating the proposed approach. The relevance of the
procedure in the context of recent UCTE operational security
policy recommendations is also stressed. The procedure has been
implemented in an AC power ﬂow program and tested on a
three-area variant of the IEEE 118-bus test system.
Index Terms—Power system equivalents, sensitivity analysis,
static security assessment, multiple transmission system operators
I. INTRODUCTION
Reorganization of power systems towards a market-based
environment has led the Transmission System Operators
(TSOs) to operate with lower security margins. According to
the present practice, each TSO is responsible for the security
assessment of his own area, but a higher level of awareness
and coordination among the TSOs is desirable to improve the
security of the whole interconnection, as stressed by some of
the blackouts experienced over the recent years [1], [2].
In North America the effort has been to create Regional
Transmission system Operators, which are higher-level op-
erational entities responsible for the coordination of TSOs.
This approach, however, does not seem currently feasible
in Europe. As a matter of fact, European directives provide
general objectives, guidelines and principles only but, at the
bottom level, the coordination of the different TSOs is based
on multi-lateral negotiations and collaborations. There are
some initiatives such as a coordination center being currently
put in operation jointly by France and Belgium.
Carrying out a complete and detailed security analysis over
the whole European interconnection in a central point may
not be desirable or even feasible in the coming years. Indeed
centralized large-scale computations might become intractable
from the computational point of view and the knowledge by
each individual TSO of his own system could be somewhat
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lost [3]. As an alternative, a coordination center might serve
as a hub for the information exchange discussed in this paper.
This paper reports on static security assessment within the
collaborative framework proposed in [4]. In this context, each
TSO is committed to:
• computing and making available an equivalent model of
his system, to be included by other TSOs in their external
system model;
• determining for each contingency originating in his sys-
tem relevant quantities allowing the other TSOs to com-
pute its impact on their own systems.
The second aspect, usually ignored in today’s security
assessment, may involve the communication among TSOs of
tie-line power ﬂow changes under the effect of contingencies.
The derivation of external equivalents has been largely
investigated in the power system literature [3], [5], [6], [7], [8],
[9], [10], [11]. Reference [7] provides a comprehensive review
of external network modeling approaches with the emphasis
on Ward and REI type equivalents as well as their variants.
In this paper, a sensitivity-based equivalent is proposed. This
equivalent assumes exchange of sensitivity and tie-line power
ﬂow information between the TSOs and is equally applicable
for branch as well as generator outages. The quality of this
equivalent is judged by how well it represents the effects of the
external systems on the internal system for the evaluation of
contingencies appearing in the internal system. Computational
efﬁciency is also considered, in terms of the amount of data
required and the computational burden added with respect to
a standard power ﬂow computation to generate and exploit the
equivalent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews present
practice and some recent activities at the European level within
the context of power system operational security. Section III
outlines a general multi-area security assessment framework.
The proposed sensitivity-based equivalent is presented in Sec-
tion IV. Implementation of this equivalent is considered in
Section V while the results using the IEEE 118-bus test system
are given in Section VI. Section VII offer some conclusions.
II. PRESENT PRACTICE AND RECENT ACTIVITIES AT THE
EUROPEAN LEVEL
At the European level, security assessment is usually han-
dled in a distributed way, where each TSO focuses on his own
power system, and receives accurate and updated information
only about a relatively small part of the external subsystem
(typically neighboring substations).
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2Each TSO maintains a real-time model of his system based
on real-time measurements, planned and forecasted quantities,
and off-line data. The latter may include some external equiv-
alents provided by the neighboring TSOs.
From the European power system perspective, efforts have
been made towards the standardization of operational policies
and practices. These efforts are summarized in the UCTE
Operation Handbook [12]. One section of this handbook
focuses on information exchange between the TSOs.
The TSOs yearly provide each other with a provisional
data-set including network, generation, load and exchange
programmes for the preparation of a reference case, the so-
called UCTE base case. Moreover, the TSOs yearly provide
each other with data sets for a full representation of their
network in real-time conditions (the so-called snapshots) [12].
Recent activities at the European level are summarized in
the additions [13], [14] to the Operation Handbook [12]. Both
documents are dedicated to Policy 3 (Operational Security).
The need for a regional approach to security assessment and
control is clearly identiﬁed in these documents. The documents
provide deﬁnitions, standards, and guidelines for a regional
approach to the N-1 security rule in the context of operational
planning and real-time operation.
Some important deﬁnitions, directly related to the topic of
this paper, are the following [13], [14]:
• Responsibility area. The TSO is responsible for the secure
operation (N-1 principle) of its own grid and all the in-
terconnection tie-lines to adjacent TSOs. The equipment
making up this network is called responsibility area.
• Inﬂuence factor, is a numerical value used to quantify
the highest effect of the outage of an external network
element on any internal network branch.
• Contingency inﬂuence threshold, is a numerical limit
value against which the inﬂuence factor must be
checked.The outage of an external element with an inﬂu-
ence factor higher than this threshold is considered having
a signiﬁcant impact on the responsibility area.
• External contingency list. External elements with a con-
tingency inﬂuence factor higher than the contingency
inﬂuence threshold are considered as part of the external
contingency list.
Furthermore, the documents deﬁne that each TSO, at any
operational planning stage or in real-time, simulates the risk
coming from outside based on the external contingency list,
and informs its neighbors of the risk of cascading from outside
to inside [13], [14].
The objectives of the work presented in this paper is
to illustrate one aspect of the general multi-area security
assessment and control framework introduced in [4]. In the
authors’ opinion this framework ﬁts well the regional security
assessment and control problem discussed in the UCTE doc-
uments. The speciﬁc aspect of this framework considered in
the present paper is the implementation of the sensitivity-based
equivalents of the TSO responsibility areas.
III. MULTI-AREA SECURITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
The general multi-area security assessment and control
framework introduced in [4] is outlined in Fig. 1. Although
introduced in the context of dynamic security assessment and
control, the framework is equally applicable in the context of
static security, as considered in this paper.
Fj(c)
results for TSO j
results for TSO k

















Fig. 1. Computations and data ﬂow for TSOi
This framework deﬁnes a common information exchange
scheme and the way to coordinate preventive and corrective
actions among the TSOs. The common information exchange
allows each TSO not only to run his own security assessment
locally, but also to appreciate the security level of the whole
interconnection. The framework is a symmetric scheme where
all TSOs carry out their work in parallel and in the same way,
thrust each other, are fair, and do their best to identify potential
security threats.
We shortly present the main features of the framework (for
more details, the reader is invited to refer to [4]). Let Di(c)
denotes the real-time data about the system of TSOi (SCADA,
state-estimator output, contingency lists, etc.) that this TSO
obtains from his EMS system at some security assessment
cycle c. The following tasks are performed (see Fig. 1):
• TSOi computes from Di(c) the information Ii(c) about
his subsystem that he will communicate to all other TSOs.
Ii(c) is composed of an equivalent of area i and possibly
safety bounds which indicate the changes of injections
into area i which can be safely discarded as yielding no
risk of violations inside area i;
• TSOi broadcasts Ii(c) to all other TSOs. At the same
time, he collects the information Ij(c), ∀j = i broad-
casted by them;
• TSOi computes the consequences of all plausible con-
tingencies originating in his area. He uses to this purpose
Di(c) and Ij(c), ∀j = i. Let us denote the results of this
assessment by Ai(c);
• For each j = i, TSOi determines from Ai(c) and Ij(c)
the contingencies that are possibly dangerous for TSOj
and the information required by TSOj to evaluate the
consequences of these contingencies in his system. This
information is denoted as Aj,i(c);
• For each j = i, TSOi sends Aj,i(c) to TSOj . At the
same time, he collects Ai,j(c) sent to him by TSOj ;
Authorized licensed use limited to: Thierry Van Cutsem. Downloaded on November 6, 2009 at 03:08 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
3• TSOi uses Ai,j(c), ∀j = i, and Di(c) to evaluate
the exact consequences in his area of the contingencies
originating in other areas that were labeled as potentially
dangerous for his area by at least one of the TSOs.
In the particular implementation presented in this paper,
each TSOi reduces the information Ii(c), that he broadcasts
to all the others, to a static sensitivity-based equivalent model
of his system. Furthermore, for each contingency that he
evaluates, he sends to TSOj (∀j = i) the information Aj,i
in the form of variations of tie-line power ﬂows (under the
effect of contingencies).
The objective is to exchange the minimal amount of in-
formation with minimal loss of accuracy of the results. So,
instead of using detailed data-consuming models, equivalents
are used.
It is expected that the computational effort and the amount
of data required to use the equivalents will be small with
respect to those required by an unreduced model.
This paper does not consider the idea proposed in [4]
to reduce the information ﬂow by exploiting safety bounds
provided by each TSO so as to ﬁlter the amount of post-
contingency power ﬂow sets that need to be exchanged. In-
stead, it is assumed that each TSO determines which variation
of tie-line power lows have a signiﬁcant impact on his system
and hence require a more detailed analysis.
IV. SENSITIVITY-BASED EQUIVALENTS
In this work, the equivalents take on the form of sensitivity
matrices that are easily computed and incorporated to power
ﬂow computations.
A feature of the approach presented in this paper is the use
of a comprehensive sensitivity formula to represent the effect















+ h ΔPd, (1)
where (P0,Q0,θ0,V0) are base case powers and volt-
age phase angles and magnitudes at the boundary buses,
(Peq,Qeq) are equivalent active and reactive power injections
in boundary buses, S is a sensitivity matrix linking changes
in boundary bus power injections to changes in boundary bus
voltage magnitudes and phase angles.
Vector h links changes in active and reactive power in-
jections at boundary buses to changes in generations in the
equivalenced system. More precisely, assuming a power im-
balance ΔPd (caused typically by a generator outage) outside
the equivalenced system, (h ΔPd) represents the variation in
boundary bus injections under the effect of speed governor
responses (primary frequency control) in the equivalenced
system. Both S and h are determined using a well-known
sensitivity formula (e.g. [15]) applied to the power ﬂow
equations relative to the equivalenced network only.
Let us denote by f(x,p) = 0 the power ﬂow equations in
compact form, where x is the vector of bus voltage magnitudes
and phase angles and p a vector of parameters. Let us also
denote by η(x,p) a quantity of interest, function of x and p.















where ∂f∂x denotes the Jacobian of f with respect to x, and
similarly for the other matrices and vectors. S is obtained by:
• attaching a ﬁctitious generator with constant voltage
magnitude and phase angle to each boundary bus;
• setting η to either the active or the reactive power injected
by one of these ﬁctitious generators;
• taking for p the voltage magnitudes and phase angles of
the ﬁctitious generators;
• using (2) transposed to obtain the row vector of S relative
to the selected power.











where the sensitivity matrix Sh is obtained by the same
procedure as for S with the only difference that for p the active
power generations of the generators inside the TSO are taken.
Participation factors pf1, pf2, ..., pfg are determined from the
permanent speed droop characteristic of each individual gen-
erator.
The computation of S and h only involves solving linear
systems based on the sparse Jacobian matrix. Indeed sηp is








and substituting y into (2). To this purpose, the already
available factors of ∂f∂x are re-used.
Thus, for each boundary bus, the following data are needed:
• the base case solution (P 0, Q0, θ0, V 0);
• the sensitivities of P eq , Qeq with respect to θ, V of every
ﬁctitious generator;
• the two components of h.
For Nb boundary buses, the total number of data is Nb(4+
4Nb + 2) = 4N2b + 6Nb.
The second term in the right-hand side of (1) has some
similarities with the Jacobian equivalent concept in Ref. [10]
but different in as far as it is based on the sensitivities
calculated using the already factored Jacobian matrix. At the
same time, the sensitivity-based equivalent retains some nice
properties of the Jacobian concept such as correct incremental
performance [10].
The third term in the right-hand side of (1) bears some
similarity with the equivalent shown in [9], which models
the steady-state MW response to a generator outages of the
external system, after primary speed control action. Thus, the
sensitivity-based equivalent is applicable for branch as well as
generator outages.










































































































































































Fig. 3. System model to evaluate an internal contingency in C
The main advantages of the sensitivity-based equivalents
are: accuracy, P − V and Q − θ coupling not neglected
(hence the compromise explained in [7] is not required), use
of already available factors of ∂f∂x .
The fact that the equivalent is linear as well as the need
to slightly modify standard power ﬂow programs in order to
embed the sensitivity matrix S into the Jacobian, are the main
limitations of the proposed technique.
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SENSITIVITY-BASED
EQUIVALENT
Figure 2 shows a hypothetical 5-TSO system to demonstrate
how the sensitivity-based equivalent would be used within the
general framework given in Section III.
In the ﬁrst step of the procedure, contingencies are simu-
lated. To this purpose, each TSO will use the detailed model
of his network and all tie-lines and will attach the equivalent
model of the other TSO’s network.
For instance, if we consider security assessment by TSO
C, Fig. 3 shows the replacement of the external system by
sensitivity relationships, using one set of eqns. (1) per area,
and preserving tie-lines. When a TSO computes the sensitivity-
based equivalent for other TSOs it switches his slack bus to the
PV type with all boundary buses become V − θ buses. This
resolves the problem of having sensitivities computed with
respect to different slack buses. Note also that the “identity” of
each external TSO is retained (each external TSO is considered
as a “super node”). This preserves sparsity since in practice a
TSO is connected to other TSOs through a small number of
tie-lines only. The computational burden added to a standard












Fig. 4. System model to evaluate an external contingency in C
• adding to the Jacobian the elements of the sensitivity
matrix, and
• updating boundary bus (active and reactive) powers ac-
cording to the power imbalance ΔPd caused by the
contingency.
inserting in the Jacobian a few elements, updating the Jacobian
itself with the addition of the elements of the sensitivity matrix
and considering in the ﬁrst iteration the power deﬁcit in the
computation of the active and reactive power injections at the
boundary buses.
In the second step of the procedure, for each internal
contingency considered, each TSO informs the others on the
likelihood of the contingency, whether it is internally harmful
or harmless and the post-contingency active and reactive power
ﬂows in tie-lines.
Using this information, each TSO will assess the impact
on his system of external contingencies. To this purpose, he
uses the detailed model of his area and tie-lines, and attaches
equivalent PQ generators at the boundary buses forcing the
active and reactive power ﬂows computed by the TSO in which
this external contingency has taken place. For instance, Fig. 4
shows how the impact on area C of a contingency located
outside this area is going to be evaluated by the TSO of area
C.
Finally, for each external contingency considered, each TSO
informs the others whether it is internally harmful or harmless.
The only information that each TSO is requested to publish
are the equivalent model of his area and the results of his own
security assessment including the changes in tie-line power
ﬂows.
It must be stressed that the information about all the tie-
lines are considered common information and that the outage
of each tie-line is computed by each TSO. Hence, the resulting
post-contingency tie-line ﬂows are computed and published
several times (once by each TSO, each one using a detailed
model of his system and the equivalent models provided by the
others). All these values will be coherent if all the equivalent
models are of good quality and the computations of individual
TSOs are sufﬁciently well synchronized. Thus, all TSOs could
detect potential inconsistencies in the models they use and
such inconsistencies may be exploited to trigger procedures
for improving the quality of the exchanged information for
reducing the cycle time of information exchange or for better
synchronization of the individual computations.





Fig. 5. The partition of the IEEE-118 network
The procedure provides some incentives for the TSOs to
publish good quality equivalents and to keep them updated
in real-time. Indeed, providing good equivalents to the other
TSOs is necessary for being able to predict correctly the
impact of external contingencies on one’s area, while receiving
good equivalents from the others is sufﬁcient for being able
to predict correctly the internal consequences of internal
contingencies and the other TSOs to compute the effects on
their system of these contingencies.
In principle, the proposed procedure obliges each TSO to
compute the effects on his system of all the contingencies
(including the external contingency list as deﬁned in [13], [14])
analyzed and published by any TSO.
In the worst case, each TSO thus has to compute the detailed
impact of all internal and external contingencies, but on a
network considerably smaller than the original one. Moreover,
each TSO is committed to maintaining and monitoring only
his part of the system.
VI. TEST SYSTEM AND RESULTS
The approach has been tested on the IEEE 118-bus system
(see Fig. 5). The system has been decomposed into 3 areas,
referred to as Northern (N), Western (W), and Southern (S),
respectively.
The bus and line data used are slightly different from the
original one [16], since the system has been stressed in order
to increase possible overload effects of contingencies.
To create harmful situations, the MVA limits of all lines
have been decreased to 75 % of their initial values.
A. Validation of the equivalent model
In order to validate the sensitivity-based equivalent, several
tests were performed in the area N, with the areas S and W
replaced by their respective equivalents. The validation was
performed through comparison of results for base case and
for variations of system parameters around the base case.
First, the equivalent has been tested by replacing the (non-
linear) power ﬂow equations in areas W and S by their linear
approximation (1) and solving the base case. No signiﬁcant
differences were found in the results when compared to the
Fig. 6. Variation of the voltage phase in the bus Sporn
base case solution of the unreduced model. A few differences
occurred in the voltage magnitudes and phase angles but they
were below 10−4 pu and 10−4 rad. Mismatches on boundary
bus powers were all within the given tolerances (0.1 MW, 0.1
Mvar).
Next, the sensitivities were tested for small variations
around the base case solution. The tests consisted in forcing
small variations of one parameter at a time and observing
the changes produced in the variables of interest. The results
shown in Fig. 6 refer to variations of the active power
injections with respect to variations of the voltage phase angle
at the boundary bus Sporn.
In Fig. 6 the lines correspond to the linear approximation,
while the dots have been obtained by treating all boundary
buses as V − θ buses in the original, unreduced model, and
imposing a change in voltage phase angle at one of those buses
only. As can be seen no signiﬁcant difference can be identiﬁed
in the results. The variations of the voltage phase angle were
between -0.03 and 0.03 rad, leading to signiﬁcant changes of
the active power ﬂowing in the tie-lines of more than 200 MW.
The tests performed with variations in the active power
generation pattern (in the range 0-300 MW), assuming an
active power generation surplus in area S, as well as with small
variations in voltage magnitudes, revealed some differences
in reactive power ﬂow injections with the largest error of
5.7 (Mvar) and 2.6 (Mvar), respectively, at bus Sporn. These
differences are acceptable, particularly having in mind that the
variations in active power generation were not small.
B. Representative security assessment results
The security assessment in the N area is considered here,
while the S and the W are replaced by their respective
sensitivity-based equivalents. The set of contingencies include
internal branch outages, internal generator outages and tie-line
branch trippings.
The detailed effects of the area N set of contingencies on
the S and W areas are computed on these networks with
PQ generators attached at their boundary buses, forcing the
active and reactive tie-line power ﬂows resulting from the
contingencies computed in area N. For the purpose of accuracy
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6checking, all contingencies have been also analyzed on the
unreduced model of the system.
The set of contingencies considered in N area security
assessment includes: 21 internal branches, 9 tie-lines, and
6 generators. For each contingency the variations of tie-line
power ﬂows are passed on to the S and W areas.
Out of the above 21 internal contingencies, 2 revealed to
be harmful for other areas: the outage of the line ”LEast-
Lim2Muskngum” (for S area) and the outage of the trans-
former ”TEastLim2EastLima” (for W area). The ﬁrst produces
the worst effects. This contingency trips one circuit of a 345-
kV line carrying 380.7 MW and 30.8 Mvar. This causes four
lines and a transformer to be overloaded in the N area. Two
interconnection tie-lines are also overloaded.
The base case power ﬂows in the tie-lines as well their
variations under the effect of the above contingency are listed
in Table I.
TABLE I
TIE-LINE POWER FLOWS AND THEIR VARIATIONS AFTER THE WORST
BRANCH CONTINGENCY IN AREA N.
Areas P (MW ) ΔP (MW ) Q(Mvar) ΔQ(Mvar)
S-W -168.7 -81.1 31.2 10.8
S-W -168.7 -81.1 31.2 10.8
S-N -131.7 -17.8 -7.2 -12.1
S-N -97.8 -12.8 5.3 -9.3
S-N -19.8 115.8 16.9 -2.0
S-N -19.8 115.8 16.9 -2.0
W-N 44.2 -8.7 -21.0 -10.8
W-N 93.9 -9.5 -17.6 -9.8
W-N -1.2 -132.1 -70.3 -15.5
W-S 160.1 74.7 -60.1 -33.9
W-S 160.1 74.7 -60.1 -33.9
This speciﬁc contingency causes ﬁve lines in the S area
(checked by the TSO of area S using the equivalent PQ
injections provided by the TSO of area N) to be overloaded
with the highest overload of 47.5 % above the MVA limit on
the interconnection tie-line ”Lsporn2Portsmth”.
One generator outage (generator ”GMuskngum”) in area N
revealed to be harmful for area W. This contingency trips a
generator producing 350.0 MW and 272.3 Mvar. This causes
a line to be overloaded in the N area. No overload was found
on the interconnection tie-lines.
The base case power ﬂows in the tie-lines as well their
variations under the effect of the above contingency are listed
in Table II.
TABLE II
TIE-LINE POWER FLOWS AND THEIR VARIATIONS AFTER THE WORST
GENERATOR CONTINGENCY IN AREA N.
Areas P (MW ) ΔP (MW ) Q(Mvar) ΔQ(Mvar)
S-W -78.3 9.3 18.2 -2.2
S-W -78.3 9.3 18.2 -2.2
S-N -118.0 -4.1 5.2 0.3
S-N -89.7 -4.7 15.2 0.6
S-N -219.5 -83.9 1.8 -17.1
S-N -219.5 83.9 1.8 -17.1
W-N 42.1 -10.8 -3.8 6.4
W-N 92.9 -10.5 -2.2 5.6
W-N 63.4 -67.5 -34.7 20.1
W-S 76.5 -8.9 -22.3 3.9





































































































































































































































































Fig. 8. The biggest mismatches in active power ﬂows (branch contingency)
This speciﬁc contingency causes one line in the area W
to be overloaded (checked by the TSO of S using the PQ
injections provided by the TSO of area N) with the line
”LCollCrnrTanrskCk1” being loaded a little above its MVA
limit.
C. Accuracy of the equivalent model in case of a branch
contingency
Next, the accuracy of the equivalencing procedure with
respect to the unreduced system model is shown for the worst
branch (out of all internal and interconnection lines) outage
contingency.
Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the results of the worst contingency,
in terms of biggest mismatches on the boundary bus voltage
magnitudes as well as active and reactive power ﬂows in the
tie-lines.
More precisely, the ﬁgures show the discrepancies between
the solutions obtained, on one hand, with a standard contin-
gency evaluation performed on the whole, unreduced model
and, on the other hand, with the proposed two-step procedure.
The errors observed on voltage magnitudes are within 0.002
pu. The errors experienced on tie-line power ﬂows are within
6 MW and 3 Mvar, respectively. The branch with the worst
results is the double circuit tie-line ”LMuskngumSporn”.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 11. The biggest mismatches in active power ﬂows (generator contin-
gency)
D. Accuracy of the equivalent model in case of a generator
contingency
Finally, the results similar to those of the previous section
are shown for the worst generator outage contingency.
Figures 10, 11 and 12 illustrate the accuracy of the
equivalent model for the worst generator contingency in area
N (generator ”GMuskngum”). The shown results are of the





































































































































































Fig. 12. The biggest mismatches in reactive power ﬂows (generator
contingency)
The errors observed on voltage magnitudes are within
0.0004 pu. The errors experienced on tie-line power ﬂows
are within 3.5 MW and 1 Mvar, respectively. These results,
together with those of previous subsection, show that the
accuracy of the procedure is quite satisfactory for practical
applications.
E. Discussion
In our simulations we did not consider the possibility for
some generators hitting active or their reactive power limits.
The problem of hitting active power limits could be handled
by properly re-computing vector h. A similar procedure would
be very difﬁcult for reactive power limits. However, to the
authors’ knowledge, reactive power limits are not handled in
external system equivalents.
It could be also envisaged to have the active power
rescheduling managed in an iterative way, avoiding to leave
the slack bus of the particular TSO network model on the
variation of losses.
Besides the equivalents, the proposed approach can be im-
proved and extended in several directions. Natural extensions
would deal with a ﬁltering or bounding as well as static
security control aspects. In particular a bounding method [17],
especially the complete bounding one [18], would strengthen
the approach presented in this paper by deﬁning inﬂuence
factors and appropriate thresholds [13], [14].
It would be also interesting to extend this work to dynamic
security assessment, based on either a full dynamic model or
a Quasi Steady-State approximation [15]. While the multi-
area security assessment framework would still be valid the
equivalents should be extended to dynamic equivalents, in
which the dynamics of the active and reactive power injections
can be computed from the knowledge of the dynamics of
voltage magnitudes and phases.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has described a procedure relying on sensitivity-
based equivalent for the multi-area static security assessment
of large interconnected power systems operated by a team of
TSOs.
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multi-area security assessment framework and recent activities
at European level (UCTE recommendations on operational
security policy), has been stressed and discussed in the paper.
The equivalent has been validated by the comparison of
the results for base case with respect to the unreduced model
and by variation of system parameters around the base case
solution.
The proposed sensitivity-based equivalent model, tested on
the IEEE-118 network, proved to be a good compromise
between computational speed and accuracy of the security
assessment computations. The validation and accuracy check-
ing revealed that the proposed procedure is a viable approach
for security assessment of large interconnections operated by
multiple TSOs.
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